Interview guides · Judi Health

Judi Health Software Engineer Interview Questions & Guide 2026

Code reading practice for Judi Health software engineer prep: work out what unfamiliar code does before judging it.

The 60-second brief

A Software Engineer at Judi Health plays a vital role in building the infrastructure and systems that power modern, accessible healthcare solutions. As a member of the engineering team, you are responsible for developing robust, scalable, and secure software that directly impacts how patients interact with medical services and how providers manage care delivery. Your work is not just about writing code; it is about solving complex logistical and technical challenges in a high-stakes industry.

The behavioural round is a technical round in narrative form. Prepare it by collecting specifics you actually owned, such as a design you argued against, an incident you diagnosed, or a decision you later reversed, rather than by rehearsing phrasing.

Focus areas

Model bitemporal coverage and retroactive eligibility changes
Design person merges that remain reversible afterwards
Authorise every identified read against current consent

Overview

This role is particularly critical as Judi Health continues to scale its digital platforms. You will contribute to core systems—such as Identity and Access Management (IAM)—that ensure patient data security, system reliability, and seamless user experiences. Working here means navigating the intersection of rapid innovation and the rigorous compliance standards required in the healthcare sector, making this an ideal environment for engineers who value precision, security, and mission-driven development.

Where to focus your preparation

Treat the sections below as preparation areas and confirm the format with your recruiter.

Preparation focus

No round sequence has been reported for this company, so work the categories below and confirm the format with your recruiter.

What to demonstrate

Breadth across SQL, experimentation and product reasoning
Ability to state assumptions before choosing a method

How to prepare

Drill the practice exercises below and time yourself
Prepare three quantified stories about decisions you drove

Where candidates lose points

Treating a medical record number or a member ID as a globally unique key and joining on it directly.

These identifiers are unique only within the authority that issued them. Two facilities in one network routinely have the same medical record number for different people, and member IDs get reissued when someone changes plans. Joining on the bare value merges two patients' records, which is the most damaging failure available in this domain, and it passes every test written against a single-facility fixture because the collision only appears once a second source is connected.

Storing monetary amounts as floating-point numbers.

Binary floating point cannot represent values like 0.10 exactly, so summing allowed and paid amounts across millions of claim lines accumulates representation and rounding error. Reconciliation against a remittance file is exact to the cent, so the drift surfaces as a balance that is off by a few cents with no identifiable cause, and engineers lose days looking for a logic bug in code that is correct apart from its numeric type. Integer minor units or an exact decimal type removes the class entirely.

Assuming fixed-width integer arithmetic cannot overflow

In languages with fixed-width integers, including C, C++, Java, Go and Rust, computing a midpoint as (lo + hi) / 2 overflows once the sum passes the type's maximum, so write lo + (hi - lo) / 2 instead. Say which language you are in: arbitrary-precision integers, as in Python or Ruby, remove this specific hazard and none of the others.

Going silent while thinking

Narrate the candidates and why you are discarding them, even in fragments: sorting first would make this a two-pointer scan, but it destroys the original indices, which the output needs. From the other side of the table, a candidate thinking hard and a candidate stuck are indistinguishable until one of them speaks.

Questions & practice

Flatten overlapping coverage spans into a primary-payer timeline

Medium · sweep line · intervals · bitemporal

For one enterprise_person_id you hold up to 10,000 coverage_span rows: coverage_id, payer_id, plan_id, effective_date, termination_date (null means open-ended), coverage_order (1 is primary), status, valid_from and valid_to (system time). Given a system instant T and a date range D0 to D1, return disjoint business-date intervals covering that range, each labelled with the active coverage_id of lowest coverage_order, and with uncovered stretches returned explicitly. termination_date is the last covered day. Only status active counts. Target O(N log N) time, O(N) space.

Approach

Apply the system-time slice before any interval logic: keep rows where valid_from is at or before T and valid_to is after T. That single predicate is what makes the answer 'what we believed at T' rather than 'what we believe now', and a retroactive termination loaded after T leaks straight into the output if you skip it.
Convert each surviving row to a half-open day interval from effective_date up to termination_date plus one day, using positive infinity for a null termination. Half-open removes every off-by-one at the join between a termination and the next plan's effective date, which is where same-day switches get turned into false gaps.
Sweep: emit 2N boundary events, sort by date in O(N log N), and hold the active set in a min-heap keyed by (coverage_order, coverage_id) with lazy deletion, popping the top while it has already expired at the current boundary. Each coverage is pushed once and popped once, so the sweep is O(N log N) total and O(N) space.
Emit an output interval whenever the heap top changes between consecutive boundaries, and emit an explicit uncovered interval when the heap empties. A gap reported as a gap is a different answer from a gap omitted, and downstream the difference is a denial versus a silent assumption of coverage.
Fix the tie-break and state it: lowest coverage_order, then lowest coverage_id. Two rows at order 1 is a data error, and without a deterministic rule the coordination-of-benefits answer changes between two runs over identical data.
Clip to D0 and D1 last, so a coverage that starts before D0 still contributes its correct order inside the window.

Follow-up

Run the same query at two system instants and diff the timelines. What did the correction change, and what does each extra instant cost you?
A termination arrives with an effective date earlier than the service date of a claim that already adjudicated and paid. What does the timeline now say, and what has to happen to that claim?
Two enrolment files disagree on coverage_order for a dependent. What does your tie-break do, and what should the system do instead of tie-breaking?

Flag a requester reading too many distinct charts per window

Medium · sliding window · two pointers · distinct count

You consume access-audit records (event_ts, requester_id, enterprise_person_id, purpose_of_use, break_glass) at tens of thousands per second, non-decreasing in event_ts. For each requester, emit an alert the first time any sliding 600-second window contains reads of more than D distinct enterprise_person_ids. Break-glass reads count toward the window and are also reported separately. Return (requester_id, window_start_ts, distinct_count). Target O(1) amortised per event and memory proportional to the events resident in the window, not to the day.

Approach

Per requester, hold a deque of (event_ts, person_id) and a hash map from person_id to its occurrence count inside the window, plus a running distinct counter. Push on the right; while the front is older than event_ts minus 600 seconds, pop it, decrement its count and erase the key when the count reaches zero, decrementing the distinct counter. Each event is pushed once and popped once, so the amortised cost is O(1) and the memory is O(W) for window occupancy W.
Test the threshold immediately after each push and nowhere else. Between two consecutive events the window can only lose members as its left edge advances, so the maximum distinct count over all window positions is attained at a position whose right edge is an event. Checking at pushes is therefore exhaustive rather than a sampling approximation.
Latch the alert per requester and re-arm only when the distinct count falls back below D, otherwise one busy stretch emits thousands of near-identical rows and the real signal is buried by its own volume.
Bound memory both per requester and globally. A requester whose window legitimately holds tens of thousands of reads must not hold the process hostage, so cap the deque and degrade above the cap to an approximate distinct counter such as HyperLogLog, stating the error you accept in exchange.
Count break-glass toward the window but carry it in its own output field. Break-glass has to succeed during an emergency, which is exactly why it must be the most visible path in the audit, and excluding it from the count would make the abuse route the quiet one.
State the precondition: this is correct only while input is non-decreasing in event_ts. Out-of-order arrival needs a bounded-lateness buffer and a watermark, and dropping late events without a counter is the failure that hides itself.

Worked solution (25 min)

Implement push, then the eviction loop, then the distinct counter update, in that order, and assert the counter against the map size after each event.
Set D to 25 and feed 15 distinct persons between 09:06:00 and 09:08:59.
Feed 15 more distinct persons from 09:11:00, one every eight seconds.
Record the event at which the alert fires and the window_start it reports.
Re-run the same events through fixed ten-minute tumbling buckets and compare.

Expected result: The 26th distinct read lands at 09:12:20, its window covers 09:02:20 to 09:12:20 and holds all 15 from the first group plus 11 from the second, so the alert is (requester, 09:02:20, 26). Tumbling buckets of 09:00 to 09:10 and 09:10 to 09:20 see 15 and 15, and never fire.

Verify it yourself

The distinct counter equals the hash map's size after every event. A missed key erase makes it drift upward and manufacture alerts out of nothing.
Shifting every timestamp by a constant produces the same alert with a correspondingly shifted window_start.
Processing the stream in two halves sequentially yields the same alerts as one pass, provided the deque survives the split.
With D above the day's total distinct persons for that requester, nothing fires.

Follow-up

One region's events arrive up to 90 seconds late. What buffer do you add, and what does that do to alert latency?
One person uses two requester accounts. What has to change in the key, and what new false positive does that introduce?
How do you restore window state after a process restart without replaying the whole day?

Extract an idempotency key from a raw HL7v2 message

Easy · parsing · idempotency · delimiters

An HL7v2 message arrives as a byte buffer up to 256 KB, segments terminated by carriage return (0x0D), first segment MSH. MSH-1 is the field separator character itself and MSH-2 holds the encoding characters, so splitting the MSH segment on the separator puts MSH-n at index n-1 for n of 2 or more. Return the idempotency key built from MSH-4 sending facility, MSH-3 sending application, MSH-10 message control ID and MSH-7 event timestamp, with escape sequences decoded in each value. Single pass, O(n). Do not hardcode the separator characters.

Approach

Read the delimiters out of the message instead of assuming them: the byte immediately after MSH is the field separator, and the next field's bytes give component, repetition, escape and subcomponent separators in that order. Everything downstream uses those values, because a partner is entitled to send different ones and the common defaults are a convention, not a guarantee.
Verify the first three bytes are MSH before anything else and reject otherwise, since a socket read can begin mid-message. Then bound the segment at the first terminator and split that slice only, applying the n-1 offset that the MSH segment alone requires.
Decode escapes in one left-to-right pass per extracted value: on the escape character, read to the next escape character and map the codes for field, component, subcomponent, repetition and escape back to their literal characters. Treat an unterminated escape as a malformed message rather than dropping the tail silently.
Normalise MSH-7 to UTC before it enters the key. The timestamp may carry an offset or omit one, and two spellings of the same instant must hash identically or the ledger stops deduplicating the moment a partner changes its formatter.
Compose the key as the full tuple, not the control ID alone. The control ID is unique only per sending application and some senders roll the counter over, so facility plus application plus control ID plus instant is the smallest key that survives a rollover.
Cost is O(n) time and O(k) space for the extracted values. Hashing the whole body is also O(n) but cannot distinguish a genuine resend from a corrected retransmission that reuses the control ID, which is a different event.

Follow-up

One partner sends MSH-7 with no timezone offset and another sends it with an offset. What do you store, and what do you compare on?
A sender rolls its control ID counter over and restarts from zero. Which component of your key absorbs that, and which message pairs would still collide?
Segments arrive separated by line feed instead of carriage return, or with a trailing empty field. Which should the parser accept and which should it negatively acknowledge?

Fix a paid-amount report that double counts claim versions

Medium · join fan-out · versioned claims · aggregation correctness

claim_line: claim_line_id, claim_id, claim_version smallint, line_number, frequency_code in ('original','replacement','void'), enterprise_person_id, coverage_id, billing_provider_npi, service_from_date, procedure_code, units, billed_amount_cents bigint, allowed_amount_cents, paid_amount_cents, adjudication_status, UNIQUE (claim_id, claim_version, line_number). A monthly report sums paid_amount_cents and joins coverage_span on enterprise_person_id with date overlap to attribute a plan. It overstates payment by roughly 9%, and reconciliation against remittance fails. Name both causes, then write the corrected query returning paid cents and plan per billing_provider_npi for March 2026 service dates.

Approach

Cause one: the SUM spans every claim version. A replacement supersedes a prior claim and a void cancels one, so a replaced claim contributes twice and a voided claim contributes once when it should contribute nothing. Resolve the surviving version per claim_id before aggregating, never by deleting superseded rows.
Cause two: the coverage join is one-to-many. coverage_span carries a system-time version per coverage period, so a person with three beliefs about one period multiplies every claim line by three. The join is for a label, not for filtering, so it must not be allowed to change cardinality.
Collapse the version chain with DISTINCT ON (claim_id) ... ORDER BY claim_id, claim_version DESC, then join the lines back on (claim_id, claim_version), and exclude the surviving version when its frequency_code is 'void'.
Make the coverage lookup cardinality-safe with a LEFT JOIN LATERAL ... LIMIT 1 pinned to valid_to = 'infinity' and ordered by valid_from DESC. LATERAL with LIMIT 1 cannot fan out by construction; a plain join can, and no amount of later DISTINCT repairs a SUM that already doubled.
Keep the money in integer minor units the whole way. SUM(bigint) returns numeric in PostgreSQL, so there is no overflow and no binary floating-point error; cast to a display type only at the edge.

Worked solution (35 min)

Prove cause one with a diagnostic: SELECT claim_id, count(DISTINCT claim_version) FROM claim_line GROUP BY 1 HAVING count(DISTINCT claim_version) > 1 — confirm the affected claims exist and their paid totals.
Prove cause two by running the original report with count(*) alongside the SUM and comparing it to the count of qualifying claim_line rows; any excess is fan-out.
Write the surviving-version CTE with DISTINCT ON (claim_id).
Join the lines to it on both claim_id and claim_version, exclude 'void', filter adjudication_status = 'paid' and the half-open March service-date range.
Attach the plan label through LEFT JOIN LATERAL with LIMIT 1, then re-run the count(*) check and confirm it now equals the qualifying line count exactly.
Diff the new total against remittance and confirm the 9% gap closes to zero cents, not to 'close enough'.

Expected result: WITH surviving AS ( SELECT DISTINCT ON (claim_id) claim_id, claim_version, frequency_code FROM claim_line ORDER BY claim_id, claim_version DESC ) SELECT cl.billing_provider_npi, cov.plan_id, SUM(cl.paid_amount_cents) AS paid_cents FROM claim_line cl JOIN surviving s ON s.claim_id = cl.claim_id AND s.claim_version = cl.claim_version LEFT JOIN LATERAL ( SELECT cs.plan_id FROM coverage_span cs WHERE cs.enterprise_person_id = cl.enterprise_person_id AND cs.valid_to = 'infinity' AND cs.effective_date <= cl.service_from_date AND (cs.termination_date IS NULL OR cs.termination_date >= cl.service_from_date) ORDER BY cs.coverage_order, cs.valid_from DESC LIMIT 1 ) cov ON true WHERE s.frequency_code <> 'void' AND cl.adjudication_status = 'paid' AND cl.service_from_date >= DATE '2026-03-01' AND cl.service_from_date < DATE '2026-04-01' GROUP BY 1, 2;

Verify it yourself

Replacing the aggregate with count(*) yields exactly the number of claim_line rows that pass the same predicates without the coverage join — equality proves the LATERAL did not fan out.
Removing the LATERAL entirely changes no monetary total, only the plan column; if the total moves, the join is still multiplying.
Every claim_id appears with exactly one claim_version in the surviving CTE: count(*) equals count(DISTINCT claim_id).
The corrected total reconciles to the remittance file to the cent, and the residual for each voided claim is exactly its previously included paid amount.

Follow-up

A replacement arrives before its original. Your surviving-version logic picks max(claim_version) — what does the report show in the window before the original lands, and does the number self-correct?
Add a claim_line_adjustment table with several reason codes per line. What does that do to this query, and where do you aggregate to keep it safe?
Reconciliation is still off by 400 cents. Which of the two causes could still produce that, and what is your next query?

Denormalise consent into a decision table with a stated staleness bound

Hard · denormalisation · cache invalidation · access control

Access governance answers 'may this requester read this person's data for this purpose' on every identified read — tens of thousands per second at a 5ms p99 — from consent_directive: consent_id, enterprise_person_id, version, scope, purpose_of_use text[], grantee_org_id (NULL meaning all organisations), permit boolean, effective_ts, expires_ts, revoked_ts, status. Evaluating the normalised version history per read misses the budget. Design the denormalised decision store and its key, state the revocation staleness bound in seconds and the mechanism that actually enforces it, and say which normalised rows remain the system of record and why.

Approach

Derive the shape from the read, not from the source table. The read is a point lookup on (person, grantee organisation, purpose), so fan the purpose_of_use array out into one row per purpose and make those three columns the primary key. A GIN index on the array would serve containment queries nobody issues.
Handle the wildcard concretely. grantee_org_id NULL means 'all organisations', and NULL never equals anything, so a nullable column in the key breaks both the primary key and the equality lookup. Store a sentinel org id of 0 for the wildcard and resolve specific-before-wildcard in the lookup, or the wildcard row is silently unreachable.
Make refusal a row, not an absence. An explicit permit = false must outrank a permit for the same key, so carry a precedence rank (specific grantee beats wildcard, refusal beats permit at equal specificity) and resolve with ORDER BY rank LIMIT 1. Default deny when nothing matches, so a rebuild failure fails closed.
Separate the two staleness mechanisms and be precise about which one is the bound. The in-process decision cache has a TTL; a revocation also publishes an invalidation. The publish shortens the typical case to milliseconds, but it can be lost, so the guaranteed bound is the TTL alone — quote that number, for example 30 seconds, and justify it against the cache hit rate you need to hold 5ms p99.
Evaluate expires_ts at read time against the request clock rather than baking the decision. A cached permit whose expires_ts has passed is wrong regardless of invalidation, because no event fires when a timestamp simply goes by.
Keep consent_directive as the system of record: audit must reconstruct the directive in force at any past instant, the decision table holds only current state, and a corrupted decision table must be rebuildable by replaying the directives. Bound the write amplification by keeping grantees at organisation granularity and purposes a closed code set, so one directive expands to a known small number of rows rather than an unbounded cross product.

Follow-up

Break-glass must always succeed and must be unmistakably marked. Where does it sit relative to this lookup, and what stops it from becoming the quiet default path?
The invalidation bus is down for thirty minutes. Walk through what a revoked person's data exposure looks like minute by minute, and what the backlog does when the bus returns.
Where does the access audit record get written so that an audit-store outage degrades neither the log's completeness nor the read's availability?

How do you approach debugging a critical production issue under time constraints?

Medium

Approach

State your assumptions explicitly before working the problem.
Work from the requirement backwards to the design.
Clarify what is being asked and what a complete answer contains.

Follow-up

What assumption would you test first?
How would you know your answer was wrong?

How do you ensure your code is maintainable and scalable for future growth?

Medium

Approach

Say what you would check first and why it is the highest-information step.
Clarify what is being asked and what a complete answer contains.
State your assumptions explicitly before working the problem.

Follow-up

How would you know your answer was wrong?
What assumption would you test first?

What specific security measures do you implement when handling sensitive user data?

Medium

Approach

Clarify what is being asked and what a complete answer contains.
Say what you would check first and why it is the highest-information step.
State your assumptions explicitly before working the problem.

Follow-up

How would you know your answer was wrong?
What assumption would you test first?

Identity resolution at registration peak with reversible merges

Hard · blocking · probabilistic-matching · availability · merge-reversibility

Identity resolution sits in front of registration: one to three thousand match calls per second at morning peak against tens of millions of person records, a 200ms budget, and an availability requirement higher than the systems calling it. It writes person_identity_link (enterprise_person_id, assigning_authority, source_person_id, match_score, link_status, version, superseded_by_link_id, decided_by, decided_at). Design candidate generation, the deterministic-then-probabilistic pipeline and its outcome bands, and what registration does when the service is degraded — all without making a merge irreversible.

Approach

Kill the naive framing with arithmetic: scoring an inbound record against tens of millions of candidates is on the order of 10^7 comparisons per call at up to 3,000 calls per second, which no scoring function survives. Block first — several cheap candidate-generation passes such as phonetic surname with birth year, normalised phone, and normalised address with birth date — unioned, cutting the candidate set to tens. Recall is now bounded by the blocking keys, which is why several passes beat one clever one.
Run deterministic rules first and short-circuit. An exact hit on (assigning_authority, source_person_id) is a btree lookup producing a link with no score at all. Probabilistic scoring runs only when deterministic fails, which keeps the median call in single-digit milliseconds and leaves the 200ms budget for the tail.
Define three outcomes, not two: auto-link above an upper threshold, reject below a lower one, and potential_duplicate in between routed to human review. One threshold forces a choice between merging two different people and fragmenting one person's record, and the middle band is exactly where both errors live.
Implement merge as a new link version rather than a rewrite. The losing identity's source records get new person_identity_link rows pointing at the winner, with superseded_by_link_id set on the prior rows; unmerge restores the previous versions. Rewriting downstream foreign keys in encounter and claim_line destroys the original attribution and makes unmerge guesswork. You accept an extra resolution step on every patient-scoped query in exchange.
Degrade deliberately and asymmetrically. Registration cannot block on a matcher outage, so fall back to a read replica of the deterministic index, and when that also fails, issue a provisional enterprise_person_id marked unresolved with the encounter queued for resolution on recovery. Degrade toward fragmentation, which is reversible, never toward merging, which is only reversible because step four held.
Close the read-your-writes gap the replica introduces: a link created seconds ago may be absent from the replica, so the same person registering twice in two minutes can acquire two provisional identities. A small write-through cache keyed on (assigning_authority, source_person_id) handles the common case without making the whole path synchronous.

Worked solution (45 min)

Compute comparisons per call with and without blocking, and state the candidate-set size each blocking pass yields.
Write the deterministic short-circuit and the probabilistic path, with the two thresholds and what happens in the middle band.
Write the merge as inserts into person_identity_link, then write the unmerge that reverses it, and trace a claim posted under the losing identity through both.
Define degraded behaviour at two levels — replica-only and fully unavailable — and state which error each one deliberately prefers.
Show the read-your-writes case and the cache that resolves it.

Expected result: Multi-pass blocking that makes per-call comparison counts tractable, deterministic matching short-circuiting ahead of probabilistic scoring, three outcome bands with a review queue for the middle, merge and unmerge expressed purely as link versions leaving downstream rows untouched, and degradation that prefers a reversible duplicate over an irreversible merge.

Verify it yourself

A merge followed by an unmerge restores every source record to its original enterprise identity, including one that had a claim posted under it.
No downstream table's person foreign key is written by the merge path.
With the matcher's scoring path disabled, registration still completes and marks the identity unresolved.
Per-call candidate counts stay in the tens across a sample of inbound records, including common surnames.

Follow-up

Two different people sharing a name and birth date were auto-linked last month and a lab result crossed charts. Walk through the unmerge and what each downstream consumer is told.
You want to raise the auto-link threshold. What do you measure first, on what labelled data, and what does the change cost the review queue?

Nightly adjudication throughput collapses with deadlocks on accumulators

Medium · deadlock · lock ordering · isolation levels

During the nightly claims batch, throughput collapses from 4,000 to about 300 claim lines a second for minutes at a time. pg_stat_database.deadlocks climbs, the PostgreSQL log carries deadlock detected with SQLSTATE 40P01, and the application retries the aborted transactions. Benefit application and the reversal handler both take SELECT ... FOR UPDATE on the member's deductible accumulator row and on the out-of-pocket accumulator row. Diagnose in order, then give a fix that removes the cycle by construction rather than by retrying faster.

Approach

Read the deadlock report before theorising. PostgreSQL logs both process IDs, the statement each was running and the relation and tuple each was waiting on, which names the two lock-acquisition orders directly. There is no need to guess which code paths collide or to reproduce it first.
Separate deadlock from ordinary contention. pg_stat_database.deadlocks counts cycles, while log_lock_waits reports waits longer than deadlock_timeout that never form a cycle. Collapsing throughput with few recorded deadlocks means a hot row — one family plan's shared accumulator — is serialising the batch, which has a different remedy from a cycle.
Account for the detector's cost. A cycle is only detected after deadlock_timeout, one second by default, so every deadlock burns at least that on both sides plus the retried work. Raising the timeout lengthens each stall; lowering it raises the frequency of the detector's checks. Neither is a fix, and both are common first answers.
Reject the two reflex answers explicitly. SERIALIZABLE does not prevent deadlocks in PostgreSQL — row-level lock cycles still occur and serialization failures with SQLSTATE 40001 are added on top — and a larger connection pool simply puts more transactions in contention for the same rows.
Remove the cycle by construction: make each member's benefit application take exactly one lock. Either fold both accumulators into a single row keyed (enterprise_person_id, plan_id, plan_year) and update it in one statement, or take pg_advisory_xact_lock over a hash of that key as the first statement of both paths. One lock cannot form a cycle with itself. Deterministic ordering via ORDER BY ... FOR UPDATE also works but depends on the chosen plan preserving that order, so it is a weaker guarantee; hash collisions in the advisory-lock variant only serialise two unrelated members, which is safe but costs throughput.
Then bound the transaction. No external call may sit between acquiring the lock and committing, or the row is held for a network round trip and the hot member serialises the batch regardless of which deadlock fix you chose.

Follow-up

A reversal arrives for a claim adjudicated under a plan design that has since changed. What amount does it subtract, where is that amount recorded, and is that still atomic under your single-lock design?
Remove the FOR UPDATE entirely and show the exact two-session interleaving that produces a lost update under READ COMMITTED, then say why a single UPDATE ... SET remaining = remaining - $1 does not have the same problem.

Suggested practice checklist

Day one measures instead of guessing, under a fixed rubric, and the remaining hours are allocated in proportion to the gaps before any studying begins. The allocation is deliberately not renegotiated midweek, because the area that feels worst on day three is usually the one that is moving.

Day 1 — Diagnostic, scored before you study anything

Sit a 110-minute diagnostic in four blocks: forty-five minutes on two coding problems, twenty-five on one design prompt taken to interface and data model, twenty of short-answer fundamentals, and twenty delivering two behavioural answers aloud.
Score each block from 0 to 3 on a fixed rubric where 3 is correct and fluent, 2 is correct but slow or prompted, 1 is partially correct and 0 is stuck, grading the artifact rather than how the attempt felt.
Allocate days two to five in proportion to 3 minus each block's score, write the allocation down, and commit to leaving it alone.

Deliverable: A scored rubric and a fixed hour allocation for the rest of the week.

Day 2 — Largest gap: find the boundary rather than the subject

Split the weakest area into named sub-skills and rate each separately. For coding those are restating the problem, choosing the structure, stating the invariant, turning the invariant into loop bounds, handling empty and single-element input, and accounting for complexity out loud.
Attempt three items positioned just above where the rating drops off, and for each write the first move you failed to make.
Re-attempt one of them from blank four hours later with nothing open.

Deliverable: A sub-skill map with the two blocking sub-skills circled.

Day 3 — Drill the blocking sub-skill by repeating the shape

Do eight short repetitions of the same shape rather than eight different problems, so what gets practised is the pattern and not the puzzle.
State the rule you now hold in one sentence, then test it against a case built to break it, a sliding window over an array containing negative values, or a cache-aside read path whose invalidation message is dropped.
Have someone else read your one-sentence rule and find the precondition you left out.

Deliverable: One rule statement with its preconditions attached and one counterexample that would have caught the incomplete version.

Day 4 — Second gap, plus maintenance on the strongest area

Run the same sub-skill decomposition on the second-largest gap in half the time.
Spend twenty-five timed minutes on the block you scored highest, choosing the hardest item you can still finish rather than a warm-up.
Write whether each area fails you on recall, on setup, or on execution, and set the fix accordingly: repetition for recall, a written checklist for setup, timed work for execution.

Deliverable: A second sub-skill map plus a one-line failure diagnosis for each area.

Day 5 — The gap that is not a skill

Record one technical and one behavioural answer, then count two things in the playback: seconds before your first clarifying question, and sentences you began without knowing where they would end.
Practise saying that you do not know, followed by how you would find out, without letting it soften into a guess, and practise stating a complexity or an estimate before being asked for it.
Redeliver one answer under a hard ninety-second cap, which forces structure ahead of detail.

Deliverable: Two recordings with a counted reduction in time-to-first-question.

Day 6 — Retest under day-one conditions

Sit the same 110-minute structure with new prompts of comparable difficulty and score it on the identical rubric.
For any block that did not move, change the method rather than adding hours: a block stuck at 1 usually means the practice was too varied, not too short.
Write down which single block you would still lose the offer on.

Deliverable: A second scored rubric placed beside the first, with one named remaining risk.

Day 7 — Full loop under interview conditions

Run a sixty-minute mock over the two blocks that moved least, with an interviewer briefed to interrupt and change direction mid-answer.
Write the recovery script for going blank: restate the question, state your assumption, name the first thing you would check.
Say every rule from the week aloud without reading it, and cut any you cannot state in a single sentence, since a rule you have to reconstruct mid-answer will not survive an interruption.

Deliverable: A one-page card holding the recovery script and only the rules you could state from memory.

Disagreement needs an outcome you did not choose

Conflict answers where you were right and everyone came round are the weakest ones. Stronger: the evidence you went and collected, what would have changed your mind, and what you did in the weeks after the call went against you. Implementing a design you argued against, properly, is a specific and checkable behaviour.

Describe your experience with IAM protocols and how you secure user access in a distributed system.

Medium · behavioural and engineering judgement

Approach

Give the blast radius: what could have broken, and what you measured.
Close with what you would do differently, concretely.
State the situation in two sentences and spend the rest on the reasoning.

Follow-up

What would you do differently if you ran that again?
What did you decide not to do, and why?

Argue against rewriting foreign keys during a person merge

Hard · merge and unmerge · schema design · technical disagreement · read path

A proposal on your team simplifies merges: on merge, UPDATE enterprise_person_id across encounter, observation_result and claim_line to the surviving identity, then delete the link-resolution step so a patient-scoped read becomes one equality predicate. The author brings a p99 improvement on the patient summary, which fans out across eight to twelve resource types. You argued against it. Reconstruct the argument: the failure you predicted, the evidence you brought, the cost of your own alternative that you conceded, and who made the call.

Approach

The probe is whether you can oppose a real performance win without retreating to data-hygiene arguments. Name the operation the proposal removes: unmerge. Once enterprise_person_id is rewritten in place, the row no longer records which source identity asserted the fact, and the only pair of columns that could — assigning_authority and source_person_id — lives in the link table the proposal deletes.
Make it concrete with money rather than with charts. A claim_line posted under the losing identity carries coverage_id pointing at that identity's enrolment span. Rewriting the person while leaving coverage_id yields a row asserting the surviving person was covered under a span that was never theirs, which is a financial statement that adjudication and reconciliation will both act on.
Do not argue that merges are rare, because that concedes the premise. Bring the rate of merges, the rejection rate on manually reviewed links, and the lag between a wrong merge and its discovery — false merges are a property of probabilistic matching, so the design has to assume them rather than hope against them.
Concede the read cost honestly, since that is where the proposal's benefit is. Resolution through a versioned link table turns one equality predicate into a lookup feeding a predicate over a set of source identities, which changes index shape and raises the composite read's p99, and the composite is the number that matters, not the per-resource one.
Offer the option that captures most of the win: a materialised current-link projection refreshed inside the merge transaction, so reads stay one predicate while the versioned link table remains authoritative and unmerge stays a supported operation rather than a recovery exercise.
Finish on the decision process, not the technical point: what you wrote down, whether you blocked the change, who owned the call, and what you did once it was made — including if it went against you.

Follow-up

Your projection and the link table disagree after a failed merge retry. Which one is authoritative, and how does a reader find out?
An unmerge lands eight months later. What has to happen to the claims adjudicated under the merged identity in between?
The author says reversibility can be handled by a nightly backup restore. Take that seriously and say exactly what it does not recover.

Reverse a fail-closed eligibility check at patient registration

Hard · reversing a decision · fail-closed · degradation · migration

You designed registration to block when the external eligibility inquiry exceeds its timeout budget, reasoning that an unverified registration becomes a denial weeks later. Months in, the payer's p99 sits near the budget, front desks are queueing, and two teams have built on the guarantee that a completed registration implies verified coverage. You reversed the decision. Walk through it: the evidence that changed your mind, what you deliberately kept fail-closed, how you migrated the teams relying on the old behaviour, and what you would change about how you made the original call.

Approach

The probe is whether a reversal is backed by measurement or by fatigue. Lead with both costs in their own units: the share of inquiries exceeding the timeout and the wait minutes that produced at the desk, against the write-off dollars attributable specifically to registrations that proceeded unverified during the pilot.
State what your original reasoning got wrong, concretely. The usual answer is that you priced the denial and not the queue, and that you reasoned about a p50 round trip when a fail-closed default is governed by the dependency's p99 and by its outage minutes, neither of which you had measured before choosing.
Show the reversal was partial, which is what a good one looks like. Emergency presentations never block, because care is not conditioned on a benefits answer; high-cost elective services keep a hard stop where the write-off is large and the delay is tolerable; everything else proceeds with coverage_status 'unverified' into a work queue that must clear before the claim is submitted.
Treat the work queue as part of the design rather than as an afterthought: what enters it, what clears it, what happens when it is not cleared before the submission deadline, and who is paged when its depth grows. A fail-open path with no queue is not a degradation strategy, it is a silent one.
Describe the migration for the teams that depended on the guarantee: a per-encounter_class flag, a period where the new decision is computed and logged while the old behaviour still stands, and the consumers told which field replaces the assumption before the switch, not after.
Close on the process change rather than the outcome — what you would now require before shipping any fail-closed default: a measured p99 from the dependency, a named owner for the blocked case, and a reversal trigger agreed in advance so the next reversal is a threshold being crossed rather than an argument.

Follow-up

Your unverified queue is 900 deep on a Monday and the submission deadline is Wednesday. What happens, and who decided that in advance?
How do you prevent 'unverified' from quietly becoming the normal path once the desks learn it is faster?
Six months later the payer's p99 halves. Do you reverse back, and what evidence would make you?