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Commercial Ltd Software Engineer Interview Questions & Guide 2026

Take-home style practice for Commercial Ltd software engineer candidates: a small service, a fixed budget, a written tradeoff.

The 60-second brief

At Commercial Ltd, the Software Engineer role—often aligned with 2nd Line IT Engineer or MPS Field Engineer functions—supports the company's operational infrastructure. You are responsible for ensuring that Commercial Ltd's internal and client-facing systems remain stable, efficient, and scalable. This position is not merely about writing code; it is about solving complex technical challenges that keep the business running.

The loop does not sample the job evenly, and arguing about that in the room costs you. Daily work is mostly incremental change inside code someone else wrote, while the loop samples narrow slices of it; prepare for the slices and save the realism argument for your questions at the end.

Focus areas

Make every write idempotent under client retries
Scope every query and cache key by tenant
Keep money in integer minor units

Overview

You will contribute to critical service environments, providing high-level technical support and system maintenance that directly impacts user productivity. Whether you are managing server environments or troubleshooting field-based hardware and software issues, your work ensures that Commercial Ltd maintains its reputation for technical reliability. Candidates report that interviewers favor engineers who are comfortable navigating both the technical requirements of the stack and the collaborative needs of a growing team.

The role is highly practical. You will be expected to demonstrate a balance between deep technical knowledge and the ability to communicate solutions to non-technical stakeholders.

Where to focus your preparation

Preparation focus

No round sequence has been reported for this company, so work the categories below and confirm the format with your recruiter.

What to demonstrate

Breadth across SQL, experimentation and product reasoning
Ability to state assumptions before choosing a method

How to prepare

Drill the practice exercises below and time yourself
Prepare three quantified stories about decisions you drove

Where candidates lose points

Checking a quota with a select and then writing

Under read-committed isolation, two concurrent transactions both observe a count below the limit and both insert, so the limit is exceeded by exactly the concurrency. Repeatable read does not rescue it either: it provides a stable snapshot, and this is write skew, which snapshot isolation permits by design. The options are serialisable isolation, which detects the conflict and aborts one transaction with a serialisation failure and therefore obliges the caller to retry; a single statement with the predicate inside the write; or a constraint that makes the surplus insert fail outright. The reason this pattern survives review is that it is correct in every test that runs one request at a time.

One shared connection pool for every tenant and every query class

A single tenant with a large table and a missing index can occupy every connection with slow queries, and every other tenant then waits in connection acquisition -- a queue invisible in database metrics, because the database itself looks healthy while the application starves. Containment is bulkheads: separate pools or per-tenant concurrency caps for interactive requests, background jobs and exports, a statement timeout low enough that a pathological query dies before it accumulates, and an idle-in-transaction timeout so a stuck client cannot pin a connection and its locks indefinitely. One caveat worth knowing in advance: if a transaction-pooling proxy sits in front of the database, session-scoped behaviour changes, so session-level advisory locks and settings applied outside a transaction do not survive the way they do on a direct connection.

Choosing a schema before the access patterns are known

Write the queries first, with their filters, sort orders, cardinalities and which ones sit on the latency-critical path, then design tables and indexes to serve them. An index nothing queries still costs write throughput and storage, and a hot query with no supporting index becomes a full scan that only hurts once the table is big.

Assuming fixed-width integer arithmetic cannot overflow

In languages with fixed-width integers, including C, C++, Java, Go and Rust, computing a midpoint as (lo + hi) / 2 overflows once the sum passes the type's maximum, so write lo + (hi - lo) / 2 instead. Say which language you are in: arbitrary-precision integers, as in Python or Ruby, remove this specific hazard and none of the others.

Questions & practice

Parse and verify a timestamped multi-signature webhook header

Easy · parsing · hmac · constant-time-compare · replay-protection

An inbound webhook carries a signature header of at most 1 KiB shaped t=<unix seconds>,v1=<64 hex chars>, with up to five v1 values during secret rotation and possibly unknown scheme keys. You hold the raw request body bytes and the currently active signing secrets. Write the parser and the verifier: accept when any active secret reproduces a signature and the timestamp is within a five-minute tolerance in either direction, reject otherwise. Single left-to-right pass over the header, no regular expression. State what is inside the MAC and why.

Approach

Parse in one scan: split on ,, then on the first = only, since a value may itself contain = under a future scheme. Accept t exactly once and treat a second t as a reject rather than last-wins. Push every v1 onto a short list and ignore any other key, so a v2 can be introduced later without breaking this verifier.
Say what is signed: HMAC-SHA256 over the exact byte string <t>.<raw body bytes>, yielding 32 bytes or 64 hex characters. The timestamp sits inside the MAC because otherwise an attacker replays yesterday's body with its still-valid signature and only has to edit the header timestamp.
Hash the bytes as received. Verifying against a re-serialised JSON body is the usual defect: key order, whitespace and number formatting all change the bytes while the parsed objects compare equal, so signatures fail for honest senders and the popular 'fix' is to stop checking.
Compare in constant time over fixed-length digests. Decode the hex to 32 bytes, accumulate acc |= a[i] ^ b[i] across the whole length, and test acc == 0 at the end. Evaluate every candidate without an early exit; at five candidates that is five HMACs over the body, linear in body size and negligible beside the network.
Apply the tolerance as a two-sided bound, rejecting when |now - t| > 300 seconds. A sender whose clock runs ahead of yours is an ordinary case, and an unbounded future timestamp is a free replay window.
Complexity: O(L) over the header producing k candidates, plus k HMACs at O(|body|) each. Space is O(k) beyond the body itself. Do the cheap rejections, including the tolerance check, before any cryptography runs.

Worked solution (15 min)

Write the grammar on one line before coding: header := field (',' field)*, field := key '=' value, split on the first = only.
Implement the parser to return {t: int, v1: [hex, ...]}, rejecting a missing t, a duplicate t, any v1 that is not 64 hex characters, and a header over 1 KiB, all before any cryptography runs.
Implement the verifier: for each active secret compute HMAC-SHA256(secret, f'{t}.'.encode() + raw_body), compare it in constant time against each parsed v1, and OR the results with no early exit.
Test with a valid signature; the same body with t moved 400 seconds into the past; the same body with t 400 seconds into the future; a header carrying an unknown v2= alongside a valid v1; and a body re-serialised with different JSON key order.

Expected result: The valid case accepts. Both out-of-tolerance cases reject, including the future one. The unknown v2 field is ignored and the v1 still verifies. The re-serialised body fails, which is correct and is exactly why the raw bytes must be retained.

Verify it yourself

Timing the comparison over 10,000 mismatching signatures that differ at the first character versus the last shows no separation you can measure.
Removing t from the MAC input makes an old captured body with its original signature pass. Write that test, watch it pass, then put t back.
Every rejection except the signature mismatch itself returns before an HMAC is computed.

Follow-up

The body is 40 MB. What changes about where you verify, and what can you do before the whole body has arrived?
A customer reports that signatures fail for exactly the requests whose body contains a non-ASCII character. What is your first hypothesis?
How do you rotate the signing secret with no failed deliveries, and how long do both secrets stay live?

Hold a tenant to a trailing sixty-second request limit

Medium · sliding-window · two-pointer · rate-limiting · tenant-skew

The gateway must hold each tenant to R requests in any trailing 60 seconds, in aggregate across three regions and every pod, within a budget of under 10 ms added p99. Peak is 30,000 requests/second across 200,000 active tenants, and traffic is heavily skewed toward a handful of them. Give an exact single-process algorithm with its amortised per-request cost and its memory per tenant, then a bounded-memory approximation and the worst-case overshoot it actually admits. Say what the distributed version does when the counter store is unreachable.

Approach

Exact, single process: a per-tenant deque of request timestamps. On arrival, pop from the front while front <= now - 60s, then admit if the remaining length is below R and push. Each timestamp is pushed once and popped once, so the cost is O(1) amortised. The O(R) version is the one that re-filters the whole deque on every request.
Quote the memory. R = 1,000 across 200,000 active tenants is up to 2 x 10^8 timestamps at 8 bytes, about 1.6 GB, and that is the worst case rather than the mean, because the long tail of small tenants holds almost nothing. Skew helps you here and hurts you in the sharding decision.
Bounded alternative, with its real bound stated: a fixed 60-second counter is O(1) memory but admits close to 2R across a 60-second span straddling a boundary. The weighted two-bucket estimate, prev * (60 - elapsed)/60 + cur, is better on smooth traffic but assumes the previous window's arrivals were uniform; an adversary packing them at the end of that window is undercounted and can still approach 2R. Say that rather than calling it exact.
Token bucket is the usual gateway answer and a different contract: O(1) state per tenant (tokens, last_refill), a sustained rate, and a deliberate burst allowance equal to the bucket size. Choose it when a burst is acceptable and the log when the limit is contractual.
Distributed: the limit is per tenant in aggregate, so a local bucket of R/N per pod is wrong in both directions under skew. A tenant landing on one pod is throttled at R/N, and a tenant spread evenly across pods exceeds R. The shared check must be a single atomic round trip, one script or one increment-and-compare, never read-then-write, and it must fit inside the 10 ms p99 budget.
Decide the unavailable case in advance and write it down. Failing open keeps the product up and lets a tenant exceed its limit for the duration; failing closed converts a counter-store outage into a full outage. Most gateways fail open on rate limits and closed on authorisation, and those are two separate decisions made separately.

Follow-up

One tenant sends 40% of all traffic. What does that do to a single counter key, and what do you shard on instead?
Quotas rather than rate limits: the check is select used; if used < limit then insert. Name the isolation level that still permits the overshoot, and the two fixes.
How do you return an accurate Retry-After from the exact algorithm without a second scan?

Fold a deduplicated usage stream into hourly rollups

Easy · aggregation · deduplication · watermarks · exact-arithmetic

You are given one day of usage_event rows, up to 250 million, each carrying event_id, tenant_id, workspace_id, environment, sku, quantity numeric(20,6), idempotency_key, occurred_at and ingested_at. Produce usage_rollup_hourly cells keyed (tenant_id, workspace_id, sku, hour_start) with quantity_sum, event_count and source_max_ingested_at. An event counts once per (tenant_id, idempotency_key). The rollup grain has no environment column, so state your filter. One pass. Give your time and space bounds, and say what the deduplication actually costs in memory.

Approach

Bucket on occurred_at, never ingested_at: hour_start = date_trunc('hour', occurred_at at time zone 'UTC'). The two columns answer different questions. occurred_at says which hour the customer is billed for; ingested_at says how current the fold is. Using the second for the first makes late data invisible instead of correctable.
The fold is trivial and the deduplication is the entire cost, so price it before designing anything clever. An exact set over (tenant_id, idempotency_key) at 250M entries, stored as a 16-byte 128-bit hash in an open-addressed table at 0.7 load factor, needs about 357M slots at 16 bytes each, roughly 5.7 GB. The fix is partitioning by hash(tenant_id) % P so each shard holds 1/P of the set and no tenant's keys straddle shards.
Rule out a Bloom filter as a replacement, in the right direction: a false positive reports 'already seen' for an event never seen, so you drop a real event and lose revenue with no error raised. It is usable only as a negative pre-filter in front of the exact set, where a miss is conclusive and a hit must fall through to the real lookup.
Accumulate in scaled integers, not binary floating point. numeric(20,6) admits values below 10^14, so one event scaled to micro-units can reach 10^20, past int64's 9.22 x 10^18; use a 128-bit or arbitrary-precision accumulator unless you first bound the per-event maximum. binary64 represents integers exactly only to 2^53, about 9.01 x 10^15, and cannot represent 0.1 at all, so two runs that sum in different orders disagree.
Carry source_max_ingested_at = max(ingested_at) over the events folded into each cell, and count event_count over accepted, post-dedup events. Without that watermark there is no way to prove later what a number did and did not include, which is the first question any reconciliation asks.
State the environment filter explicitly, because the rollup grain cannot record it. A fold that quietly includes staging bills non-production traffic; one that quietly excludes it loses a cost signal. Production-only is the billing answer, and either way it belongs in the job name and the output metadata. Complexity: O(n) time, O(distinct dedup keys) space, dominated by the dedup set rather than by the cells.

Follow-up

A producer retries at 23:59:59 and the retry lands at 00:00:01. The unique index on the daily-partitioned table must include the partition key. What gets double-counted, and what is the smallest change that fixes it?
The consumer acknowledges its batch before committing the fold. Which failure loses revenue now, and which arrangement duplicates instead?
What makes a re-run over the same day produce byte-identical rollups?

Find the join that inflates every invoice total

Medium · join fan-out · aggregation grain · sql correctness

invoice_line_item holds line_id, invoice_id, tenant_id, sku, rate_tier, quantity, unit_price_micros, amount_minor (bigint), currency, kind, voided_at. invoice_payment_attempt holds attempt_id, invoice_id, tenant_id, amount_minor, status (succeeded, failed, pending), created_at, and an invoice has many attempts. A finance report runs select i.invoice_id, sum(l.amount_minor), count(p.attempt_id) from invoice i join invoice_line_item l using (invoice_id) join invoice_payment_attempt p using (invoice_id) group by 1 and the totals are wrong. Say precisely what the sum now equals, and write a version that is also correct for invoices with zero attempts.

Approach

Compute what the query actually returns before fixing it. The two joins form a Cartesian product per invoice, so each line row repeats once per attempt row: sum(l.amount_minor) is the true total multiplied by the attempt count, and count(p.attempt_id) is attempts times lines. Three lines and two attempts report double the money and six attempts.
Reject the reflex repair. count(distinct p.attempt_id) does fix the count, because attempt_id is unique. sum(distinct l.amount_minor) does not fix the sum, because two legitimate lines with equal amounts collapse into one. DISTINCT inside an aggregate deduplicates values, not rows, and the difference stays invisible until two lines happen to match.
Aggregate each branch to invoice grain before joining: one CTE summing lines by invoice_id, one counting attempts by invoice_id, then join the two results. A LATERAL subquery per invoice is equivalent and sometimes plans better when the outer set is small. Either way every aggregate stays at the grain it was defined at.
Keep invoices with no attempts by making the attempt branch a LEFT JOIN with coalesce(attempt_count, 0). An inner join here silently drops every unpaid invoice, which is usually the exact population finance is asking about.
Push each filter to its own grain: where l.voided_at is null belongs inside the line CTE, not the outer query, or it would also filter the attempt branch through the join. Put the tenant predicate on both branches, since the denormalised tenant_id is what stops a wrong join crossing tenants.
Leave yourself a standing check: an invoice total is a function of its non-voided lines and of nothing about payments, so if changing the payment filter moves the money figure, the fan-out is back.

Follow-up

Add a third branch for credit notes applied to the invoice. Does the CTE shape still hold, and when would a single pass with filter (where ...) be better?
Over 500k invoices this report takes minutes. Which grain would you materialise, and how do you keep it correct when a line is voided?
The same report is needed per tenant per month. What index makes the line CTE cheap?

Explain why the metering dashboard scans every daily partition

Medium · indexing · partition pruning · sargability · tenant skew

usage_event is range-partitioned daily on ingested_at and holds tenant_id, workspace_id, environment, sku, quantity numeric(20,6), occurred_at and ingested_at. The only relevant index is on (occurred_at). A dashboard runs select sku, sum(quantity) from usage_event where tenant_id = $1 and date_trunc('hour', occurred_at) >= $2 and environment = 'production' group by sku, and EXPLAIN shows a sequential scan of every partition. Give each distinct reason, rewrite the predicate so an index can serve it, propose the index, and state the write cost its column order adds.

Approach

Separate the three causes rather than blaming one. First, date_trunc('hour', occurred_at) wraps the column, so the predicate is not sargable against a btree on the bare column. Second, pruning keys off ingested_at while the query constrains occurred_at, so no partition can be excluded. Third, even made sargable, (occurred_at) is not tenant-leading, so for one tenant among thousands the scan reads the whole time range and discards nearly all of it.
Rewrite the bound carefully, because the obvious rewrite is only conditionally equivalent. date_trunc('hour', x) >= $2 equals x >= $2 only when $2 is already hour-aligned; for an arbitrary $2 it means x >= date_trunc('hour', $2) + interval '1 hour'. Normalise the parameter in the caller and leave the column bare.
Restore pruning with a second, redundant predicate on the partition key: ingested_at >= $2 - interval '<late-data horizon>'. State both sides of it. It prunes to a handful of partitions, and it silently omits any event whose ingest lagged past that horizon, which is precisely what a producer replay produces. Either document the horizon as a stated bound, or partition on occurred_at and move the problem into the dedup window instead.
Propose (tenant_id, occurred_at) include (sku, quantity) per partition. A partial index where environment = 'production' mostly saves size rather than selectivity, since production dominates the three environments; take it if non-production is a meaningful share and skip it otherwise.
Price the write path honestly. At roughly 250M rows/day each extra index is another insert plus WAL per row, and a tenant-leading key scatters inserts across one hot leaf per active tenant instead of appending to a single rightmost leaf, so page dirtying and random I/O both rise. An INCLUDE payload widens every leaf entry and enlarges the index accordingly.
Add the index-only-scan caveat before someone reports it as a regression: on a freshly appended table the visibility map is not yet set for recent pages, so the INCLUDE columns still cost heap fetches until autovacuum has been through, and the newest hour is exactly the data the dashboard reads.

Worked solution (30 min)

Build 30 daily partitions with skewed tenants, one holding about 40% of the rows, then ANALYZE.
Run explain (analyze, buffers) on the original query and record how many partitions were scanned and the rows removed by filter.
Apply the rewritten predicate and the index, re-run, and confirm the plan lists only the partitions inside the ingested_at bound.
Re-run with $2 set to a non-hour-aligned timestamp and confirm the rewritten and original predicates return identical rows.
Insert an event with ingested_at six hours past occurred_at and check whether the pruning predicate excludes it.

Expected result: Three causes named separately: a non-sargable date_trunc, pruning on ingested_at against a predicate on occurred_at, and a non-tenant-leading index. A rewrite to occurred_at >= <hour-normalised $2> plus a redundant ingested_at >= $2 - horizon, an index on (tenant_id, occurred_at) including sku and quantity, a per-row write cost stated, and the late-data omission the pruning predicate introduces stated as a known bound.

Verify it yourself

The plan lists only partitions inside the ingested_at bound.
Rows removed by filter on the index scan is small relative to rows returned.
The rewritten and original predicates agree for both hour-aligned and non-aligned bounds.
A deliberately late-ingested event is visible or omitted exactly as the stated horizon predicts.

Follow-up

CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY is not supported on a partitioned parent. Give the sequence that gets this index onto 400 existing partitions without blocking ingest.
One tenant holds 200 times the median row count and the dashboard still times out for them with the index in place. What changes?
Should this read hit usage_rollup_hourly instead? State what that costs in freshness and what the watermark lets you promise.

Do you have experience working with Windows Server environments?

Medium

Approach

Clarify what is being asked and what a complete answer contains.
Work from the requirement backwards to the design.
Say what you would check first and why it is the highest-information step.

Follow-up

What assumption would you test first?
How would you know your answer was wrong?

Can you explain a complex technical issue you resolved in a previous role?

Medium

Approach

Clarify what is being asked and what a complete answer contains.
Say what you would check first and why it is the highest-information step.
Work from the requirement backwards to the design.

Follow-up

What assumption would you test first?
How would you know your answer was wrong?

How would you describe your level of proficiency with Mac operating systems?

Medium

Approach

Work from the requirement backwards to the design.
State your assumptions explicitly before working the problem.
Say what you would check first and why it is the highest-information step.

Follow-up

How would you know your answer was wrong?
What assumption would you test first?

Publish limit semantics that clients can back off against

Medium · rate limiting · quotas · degraded mode

The gateway enforces three separate limits: a per-tenant token bucket, a monthly plan quota, and a cap on concurrent in-flight requests. Tenants hold several credentials and call from three regions, and today they see undifferentiated 429s. Design the client-facing contract: which headers carry which limit, the status codes that distinguish slow down from out of plan allowance from too many in flight, and what a well-behaved SDK does for each. Also state what the gateway returns when the shared counter store is unreachable, and what bound that choice implies.

Approach

Separate the three objects before naming a header. A bucket refills continuously, a quota does not refill until the period rolls, and a concurrency cap clears when an in-flight request finishes. They have different remedies, so they cannot share a status code.
Map them accordingly: 429 with Retry-After for the bucket, where waiting works; 429 with a distinct code and a reset hint for concurrency, where waiting works only if something else completes; and 402 or 403 with a plan code for quota, where waiting never works and the SDK must surface it rather than sleep on it.
Emit RateLimit-Limit, RateLimit-Remaining and RateLimit-Reset for the bucket only, and document Remaining as advisory. It comes from a shared counter that other requests are changing concurrently, so a client treating it as a reservation has built a race.
State the aggregation in the docs: the limit applies per tenant across every credential and every region. The cheap per-pod bucket of rate/N is correct only when traffic spreads evenly, and a tenant whose connections land on a few pods is throttled well under its published limit while a widely spread one exceeds it.
Decide the degraded mode in advance and publish it. Failing open serves unmetered traffic during a counter outage; failing closed converts a counter outage into a total outage. Pick one, bound it, for example a local fallback bucket at a fraction of the limit for the duration, and say so in the contract.
Specify SDK behaviour: honour Retry-After over local backoff, apply full jitter otherwise, never retry 402 or 403, and cap total attempts so retries expire before the caller's own deadline.

Worked solution (25 min)

Write a three-row table of limit, refill behaviour, status code, headers, and the client's correct action.
Write the exact header set for one throttled response and one quota-exhausted response, showing that they differ.
Write the documentation sentence that states aggregation across credentials and regions, and the sentence marking Remaining advisory.
Choose and justify the counter-store failure behaviour, then state the numeric bound it puts on overage or on availability.
Write the SDK's decision function: given status and headers, return sleep duration or surface to the caller.

Expected result: Three distinguishable responses, with Retry-After authoritative on the two retryable ones, quota exhaustion never retried, Remaining documented as advisory, and a named degraded-mode behaviour carrying an explicit overage or availability bound.

Verify it yourself

A client can tell the three conditions apart without parsing prose.
Exactly one of the three conditions is documented as never worth retrying.
The aggregation statement mentions credentials and regions, not just the tenant.
The degraded-mode answer names a number, not only a direction.

Follow-up

Two services under the same tenant each read Remaining = 50 and each send 50 requests. What did the contract promise, and what actually happens?
How would you keep a burst from a staging workspace out of the production workspace's share of the same tenant's bucket?

One tenant's counter writes stall the whole connection pool

Medium · lock contention · connection pool · multi-tenancy

A change that made a per-tenant usage counter correct now produces site-wide latency whenever one large tenant writes: unrelated endpoints time out waiting for a connection while database CPU stays low and no statement is slow. The change wraps the counter update in a transaction that takes SELECT ... FOR UPDATE on one row, calls an external pricing service, then updates and commits. Give an ordered checklist, the arithmetic that bounds that tenant's write rate, and three repairs with the cost each one accepts.

Approach

Separate waiting from working. Low database CPU alongside high application latency points at a queue, so instrument connection-acquisition wait separately from query execution time; that queue forms in the application and is invisible in database metrics, which is why the database looks healthy throughout.
Confirm the lock rather than assuming it: sample waiting sessions and group by wait event, relation and tuple. Contention concentrated on one tuple belonging to one tenant is the signature; a deadlock would instead show the database aborting transactions after its detection timeout, which is not happening here.
Do the arithmetic out loud. Throughput on a serialised row is one divided by the lock hold time, and the hold spans the external call, so a 20 ms pricing call caps that tenant near 50 writes per second no matter how many pods run. Every waiter also holds a pooled connection while it queues, so the shared pool drains and unrelated tenants fail at acquisition.
Repair one: shrink the critical section to a single statement with the price resolved before the transaction opens. Cost is a stale price for the duration of one request and a second round trip; benefit is a hold time measured in the database's own execution time.
Repairs two and three change where the contention lives rather than how long it is held. Sharding the counter into per-(tenant, bucket) rows and summing on read multiplies write throughput by the shard count, at the cost of an aggregate on every read and a shard count you must size against the largest tenant rather than the median. Accumulating in memory and flushing periodically removes the per-write round trip entirely, paid for with a bounded loss window on crash, which is acceptable for a rate limiter and not for a billing counter.
Contain independently of which repair wins: a separate pool or per-tenant concurrency cap for this write class, a statement timeout low enough that a pathological query dies before it accumulates waiters, and an idle-in-transaction timeout so a stuck client cannot pin a connection and its locks.

Follow-up

What would a genuine deadlock look like here, which two code paths would produce one, and how does the database's response differ from what you observed?
If a transaction-pooling proxy sits in front of the database, which of your three repairs changes behaviour, and what stops working that would have worked on a direct connection?
The counter also enforces a quota. Why is SELECT the count and then INSERT still wrong after you have fixed the contention?

Suggested practice checklist

Four days sample coding, design, fundamentals and the practical rounds at deliberately shallow depth, which is enough to surface the topics you did not know were in scope. That map, rather than a guess made on day one, decides where the last three days go.

Day 1 — Coding, one pass at shallow depth

Solve one problem from each of six families, an array with two pointers, hash counting, binary search, a tree traversal, a graph traversal and one dynamic program, under a hard twenty-minute cap with no extensions, marking each finished, late, or stalled.
For every stall, write the exact move you could not make rather than the subject, so the note reads could not turn the recurrence into a loop rather than bad at dynamic programming.
Fix nothing today. The value of the pass is the unfixed record.

Deliverable: Six timed attempts marked finished, late or stalled, each stall carrying a named blocking move.

Day 2 — Design, one pass at shallow depth

Spend twenty minutes each on three different shapes, a read-heavy feed, a write-heavy ingest path, and something needing a transaction across two entities, stopping each at requirements, interface and data model.
After each, write the first question you could not answer, which is usually a number you could not estimate or a failure mode you had no vocabulary for.
Mark which of the three you would be most relieved not to be asked, and treat that as data rather than as a preference.

Deliverable: Three shallow designs, each with the first unanswerable question written at the bottom.

Day 3 — Fundamentals and the practical rounds

Answer eight short questions in writing at four minutes each, covering the material that fills the gaps between the big rounds: what happens between a URL and a rendered page, what an index costs on write, when a process is preferable to a thread, and what conditions a deadlock requires.
Do one thirty-minute practical task of the kind a take-home compresses: read an unfamiliar two-hundred-line file and write what it does, what you would change, and the one thing you remain unsure of.
Score every answer fluent, correct but slow, or absent, and keep the absent ones visible.

Deliverable: Eight scored short answers and one written reading of unfamiliar code.

Day 4 — The rounds that are about you, and the map

Deliver three behavioural answers aloud against a timer, a conflict, a failure you owned, and a decision made without enough information, marking any that ran past three minutes or contained no number.
Assemble the map: every marked item from days one to three on a single page, sorted by how likely it is to appear in your loop rather than by how uncomfortable it felt.
Choose exactly two areas for the remaining three days and write down what you are deliberately abandoning.

Deliverable: A one-page scored map of the whole surface area with two areas chosen and the rest explicitly abandoned.

Day 5 — First chosen area, to the depth you skipped

Work the higher-ranked area in four focused blocks, choosing items one level above where you stalled rather than repeating what already works.
After each block write the rule you extracted in one sentence with its precondition attached, since a rule carrying no precondition is exactly what fails under a variation.
Re-attempt the day-one or day-two item that exposed this area and compare against the original timing.

Deliverable: Four worked blocks, a timed re-attempt against the original, and three one-sentence rules with preconditions.

Day 6 — Second chosen area, where the gap is coverage rather than speed

Treat the second area differently from the first. Day five drilled something you could already half-do; this one is usually a topic you had simply never met, so build one worked reference example end to end and keep it, rather than attempting six problems badly.
Write down the vocabulary you were missing on day two or three, five terms at most, each with the one sentence that makes it usable in an answer rather than the textbook definition.
Redo the shallow attempt that exposed this area and note whether you now fail later in the problem, because moving the failure point is the realistic gain from a single day and is worth more than a score that did not change.

Deliverable: One worked reference example for the newly covered area, a five-term vocabulary list, and a note on where the failure point moved.

Day 7 — Reassemble the loop

Sit two rounds back to back with no gap, ordering them so the area you chose second comes last, because the map was built from rested, isolated attempts and the loop will reach your weaker area when you are already spent.
Write where the second round suffered from the first, which is normally the point at which structure collapses into narration.
Reduce the week to one page holding only the rules you can state without reading them.

Deliverable: Mock notes on cross-round carryover plus a one-page card of rules you can recite from memory.

The bug you decided not to fix

Engineers over-index on what they repaired. A stronger answer covers something you knowingly left broken: the alert you tuned down, the data inconsistency you documented instead of chasing, the cleanup you deferred past two quarters. Give the reasoning and the condition that would have reopened it, so it reads as a decision and not as neglect.

What is your process for troubleshooting hardware or software conflicts?

Medium · behavioural and engineering judgement

Approach

Pick a story where you made the decision, not one where you watched it.
Close with what you would do differently, concretely.
Give the blast radius: what could have broken, and what you measured.

Follow-up

How did you know your change caused the improvement?
What would you do differently if you ran that again?

Own the incident where invoices undercounted metered usage

Medium · incident response · at-least-once · billing correction · postmortem

A metering consumer acknowledged each batch before committing the fold into usage_rollup_hourly. A rolling deploy restarted consumers mid-batch for two hours; roughly 1.4M usage_event rows were acknowledged and never folded, and 61 invoices sealed against the resulting rollups before anyone noticed. Take the owner's role. Describe an incident of comparable blast radius you owned: how it surfaced, the query that sized the loss, what you stopped first, and how the money was corrected. Give a wall-clock timeline and one thing you got wrong while it was still live.

Approach

Open with the invariant that broke and the direction of the error, because they determine everything else: acknowledging before committing makes the consumer at-most-once, so this loses events rather than duplicating them, and loss raises no error anywhere. A listener who hears 'we lost revenue silently' knows immediately why detection took two hours.
Size it with a stated reconciliation rather than an adjective: sum(quantity) from usage_event grouped by (tenant_id, sku, hour of occurred_at) over the window, against usage_rollup_hourly.quantity_sum on the same keys, filtered to environment='production' because staging and sandbox are metered but not billed. Then bisect by hour and tenant until single cells explain the gap. Say how long that ran and whether a replica could serve it while the incident was live.
Separate mitigation from fix and say which came first. Mitigation is holding the sealing job, because a sealed row is frozen by design and every minute of sealing converts a recoverable rollup into an invoice correction. The fix is moving the acknowledgement after the commit, which re-introduces duplicates that the dedup check on (tenant_id, idempotency_key) must now absorb.
State the correction path in the domain's own terms: sealed periods are never edited, so each affected tenant gets an adjustment line on the next invoice with kind='adjustment' and voided_by_line_id pointing at the line it reverses, priced against the same rate tier and carrying the watermark it priced against. That is four separate numbers — tenants affected, minor units, the cycle the adjustment lands in, and when customers were told.
Close on one prevention control with its cost, not five: a per-hour reconciliation comparing raw sum to rollup sum that pages above a threshold. Name the threshold and the false-page rate you accepted, because a detector nobody will keep staffed is not prevention.
Name a mistake you made inside the response window — the wrong first hypothesis, a mitigation that made it worse — rather than a design mistake from six months earlier. That is the part candidates rehearse away and interviewers weight heavily.

Follow-up

Your fix moves the acknowledgement after the commit. What breaks now, and what absorbs it?
One undercharged tenant has since churned. Do you bill them, and who decides?
How would you have caught this in ten minutes instead of two hours, and what would that detector cost you in pages per week?

Disclose a cross-tenant webhook delivery to affected customers

Medium · cross-tenant leak · disclosure · blast radius · authorisation checks

An enqueue path took the subscription from one lookup and the payload from another. For nineteen minutes, webhook_delivery rows were created whose tenant_id did not match the subscription's tenant, and eleven payloads were signed and sent to four endpoints belonging to other customers. You hold payload_digest, delivery timestamps and response codes. Describe how you handle a disclosure of this kind: what the records prove, what they cannot prove, what you say before you know everything, the one code change that closes it, and which parts you personally drove.

Approach

Bound the population before saying anything externally. The affected set is deliveries in the window where the event's tenant and the subscription's tenant differ; the ones that actually left are those with delivered_at set and a 2xx in last_response_code. Attempted and delivered are two different counts and a disclosure has to use the right one in the right sentence.
Separate what the records prove from what they do not, and say both halves rather than the flattering one. They prove which payloads were signed, where they went, and — through payload_digest — exactly which bytes. They do not prove what the receiving system did with them, and they do not bound the window more precisely than your deploy timestamps do.
Communicate on the facts you hold, with the scope stated as an upper bound: 'at most eleven payloads, four recipient endpoints, these fields, this window' is more useful and more honest than waiting a day for certainty. The field list matters more than the event count, because a customer cannot assess exposure from 'an event'.
Name the code change precisely, because this class never originates in the delivery worker. Compare the event's tenant against the subscription's tenant at enqueue and again immediately before the payload is signed, and make the second comparison drop the delivery rather than log a warning. Say why one check is insufficient: the enqueue check protects against the bug you know about, the pre-signing check protects the boundary itself.
Run the history question in parallel and say so: a query over historical deliveries for the same mismatch tells you whether this was nineteen minutes or a year, and you would rather find the second case yourself than have a customer find it after your disclosure.
Split the response into workstreams with owners — recipients asked to delete, affected customers notified, the check landed with a test, history swept — and say which you personally drove and which you handed off. Claiming all four is not credible and claiming none is not ownership.

Follow-up

The historical sweep finds two more instances from last year. What changes in what you have already told people?
Who approves the wording, and what do you do when you are asked to soften the scope?
A customer asks you to prove a redelivery contained the same bytes as the original. What do you show them?