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Advanced Cooling Technologies Software Engineer Interview Questions & Guide 2026

A prep plan for Advanced Cooling Technologies software engineer candidates: answer first, read the solution second, repeat the misses later.

The 60-second brief

A Software Engineer at Advanced Cooling Technologies (ACT) plays a pivotal role in bridging the gap between sophisticated thermal management hardware and the digital systems that monitor, control, and optimize them. ACT is a leader in thermal management solutions, and your work will directly impact high-stakes environments, including space systems, defense, and advanced industrial applications. You are not just writing code; you are building the intelligence that ensures the reliability and performance of critical cooling technologies.

Most rounds test how you handle an under-specified problem more than what you recall. A wrong first approach you correct out loud is recoverable; a constraint you assumed silently and were never given is the expensive mistake.

Focus areas

  • Scope every query and cache key by tenant
  • Bound blast radius with per-tenant concurrency limits
  • Evolve APIs without breaking pinned SDK clients

Overview

This role is intellectually demanding and requires a blend of software proficiency and an appreciation for physical engineering principles. Because ACT often develops custom solutions for unique customer challenges, you will frequently find yourself working closely with mechanical, thermal, and electrical engineers. The ability to translate complex physical requirements into robust software solutions is what defines success in this position.

The Advanced Cooling Technologies interview process

Advanced Cooling Technologies candidates report 3 rounds · ≈ 3-5 weeks. The stages below are what candidates describe, not a published process.

Phone or Video Screen

Because the format is not fixed, the first job in the room is classification. Listen to the opening question and decide what it is: a probe into work you have already described, a fresh problem to solve now, or a conversation about how you operate. Each wants a different register, and the common failure is forcing a rehearsed structure onto a question that did not ask for it. Running a full design ritual on a ten-minute debugging question reads as not listening. When you cannot tell which it is, ask how long they want to spend and answer at that depth.

What to demonstrate

  • Whether the shape of your answer matches the question, so a yes-or-no gets answered before it is justified and an open prompt gets a direction before a detour
  • Whether you check how much depth is wanted instead of deciding for them, and whether you stop when the answer is complete rather than continuing until someone interrupts
  • Whether you can be redirected in the middle of an answer without restarting it from the beginning
  • Whether a question outside your experience gets an honest boundary followed by reasoning from what you do know, instead of a confident answer with nothing behind it

How to prepare

  • Rehearse one project at three lengths, roughly thirty seconds, three minutes, and a full walkthrough at the depth of a design review, and practise switching between them when someone interrupts mid-telling
  • Have someone ask you five questions of deliberately mixed type in one sitting without telling you the types, and score only whether you identified each one correctly before you started answering
  • Draft the sentence you will use to check depth, along the lines of asking whether the short version is useful here or they want the detail, and use it in a real conversation this week so the day of the round is not its first outing

Technical Presentation

Input bounds are the part of the prompt most often skimmed, and they usually contain the answer. They tell you which complexity class is admissible, which narrows the search before you have thought about the problem itself. As a rough planning figure, a compiled language does on the order of 10^8 simple operations per second and an interpreted one roughly an order of magnitude less. So n up to about twenty admits enumerating subsets, a few thousand admits a quadratic pass, and a million admits neither: you need near-linear, or linear with a log factor. If the bounds are missing, ask for them.

What to demonstrate

  • Whether the approach is justified by the stated input size rather than by whichever pattern you recognised first
  • Whether you ask about the properties that change the algorithm: whether the input arrives sorted, whether duplicates occur, whether values are bounded integers, whether it all fits in memory
  • Whether you can name the bottleneck in your own solution and what would remove it, even when you deliberately leave it in place
  • Whether a claimed speedup is real, since memoising a recursion only helps when subproblems genuinely overlap and the state can be keyed cheaply

How to prepare

  • For each algorithm you rely on, write down the largest n it handles in roughly a second, then check two of those figures by timing them in the language you will actually type in
  • For two weeks, write one line naming your target complexity and the bound that justifies it before you write any code, then compare that line with what you ended up submitting
  • Practise the conversion backwards: given a required O(n log n), list the mechanisms that get you there (sorting, a heap, an ordered map, divide and conquer) and choose by what the problem needs to query, not by what you used last

Onsite Interview

Nobody in the room with you decides this. Interviewers typically write their rounds up separately, often before seeing anyone else's, and the outcome is settled later from those write-ups. A split panel gets resolved by whichever note carries specific evidence, so what you want out of each room is one concrete thing that person could write down: a bug you caught yourself, a trade-off you named, a decision you owned. The rest is arithmetic. The project you describe in a behavioural conversation is often the same system you sketched an hour earlier, and the two accounts have to agree.

What to demonstrate

  • Whether the scale, team size and timeline you attach to a project hold steady when that project resurfaces in a different round
  • Whether each interviewer leaves with a specific thing to cite rather than a general impression of competence
  • Whether a trade-off you defended in one round survives a challenge in another, instead of being quietly swapped for the answer the new interviewer seemed to want
  • Whether a question you have already answered earlier in the day gets the same answer at the same depth, without visible impatience

How to prepare

  • Write a one-page sheet per project fixing the figures you will quote — request volume, data size, team size, elapsed time, what broke — and say them aloud from the sheet until they come out identical every time
  • For each round on the schedule, decide in advance the one sentence you want in that person's notes, then check in a mock that you said it outright instead of leaving it to be inferred
  • Have someone ask you the same project question twice, an hour apart, and diff the two answers for numbers that moved or a trade-off that reversed

Where candidates lose points

Treating a timed-out write as a failed write

A timeout says the response did not arrive, not that the work did not happen; the server may well have committed and then lost the connection. Retrying a non-idempotent create after a timeout is the standard way to end up with two of something, and those duplicates land precisely when the system is already degraded and least able to absorb them. The discipline is to treat a timeout as unknown: either the write carries an idempotency key so the retry is safe by construction, or the client re-reads authoritative state before deciding what to do, and the interface says unknown rather than showing a failure that invites a second click.

Serialising a tenant's writes through select ... for update on a single counter row

It is the first change that makes a counter correct, and it caps that tenant's write throughput at roughly one divided by the lock hold time. A transaction that takes the lock, makes a network call and then commits holds it for the entire round trip: at 2 ms that is about 500 writes per second for the whole tenant, and the largest tenants are exactly the ones that exceed it. The damage then spreads, because every waiter holds a database connection while it queues, so one hot tenant drains the shared pool and the symptom presents as a site-wide latency incident rather than as a lock problem. The repairs are to shrink the critical section to a single statement, to shard the counter into per-(tenant, hour) or per-(tenant, bucket) rows and sum on read, or to batch in memory and flush periodically while accepting the bounded loss that batching implies.

Listing technologies instead of trade-offs

Name the property the design needs first, such as ordered range scans, multi-entity transactions, cheap appends, or a predictable p99, then pick something that provides it and say what it gives up in exchange. Almost any component is defensible once you state the requirement it satisfies and the one it sacrifices.

Designing for a scale nobody asked for

Ask for request rate, data size, read-to-write ratio and expected growth, then size the simplest option first; one relational instance on current hardware covers a large share of real workloads. Reaching for shards, queues and a cache tier before any number has been quoted reads as pattern-matching rather than judgement.

Questions & practice

Parse and verify a timestamped multi-signature webhook header

Easy · parsing · hmac · constant-time-compare · replay-protection

An inbound webhook carries a signature header of at most 1 KiB shaped t=<unix seconds>,v1=<64 hex chars>, with up to five v1 values during secret rotation and possibly unknown scheme keys. You hold the raw request body bytes and the currently active signing secrets. Write the parser and the verifier: accept when any active secret reproduces a signature and the timestamp is within a five-minute tolerance in either direction, reject otherwise. Single left-to-right pass over the header, no regular expression. State what is inside the MAC and why.

Approach

  1. Parse in one scan: split on ,, then on the first = only, since a value may itself contain = under a future scheme. Accept t exactly once and treat a second t as a reject rather than last-wins. Push every v1 onto a short list and ignore any other key, so a v2 can be introduced later without breaking this verifier.
  2. Say what is signed: HMAC-SHA256 over the exact byte string <t>.<raw body bytes>, yielding 32 bytes or 64 hex characters. The timestamp sits inside the MAC because otherwise an attacker replays yesterday's body with its still-valid signature and only has to edit the header timestamp.
  3. Hash the bytes as received. Verifying against a re-serialised JSON body is the usual defect: key order, whitespace and number formatting all change the bytes while the parsed objects compare equal, so signatures fail for honest senders and the popular 'fix' is to stop checking.
  4. Compare in constant time over fixed-length digests. Decode the hex to 32 bytes, accumulate acc |= a[i] ^ b[i] across the whole length, and test acc == 0 at the end. Evaluate every candidate without an early exit; at five candidates that is five HMACs over the body, linear in body size and negligible beside the network.
  5. Apply the tolerance as a two-sided bound, rejecting when |now - t| > 300 seconds. A sender whose clock runs ahead of yours is an ordinary case, and an unbounded future timestamp is a free replay window.
  6. Complexity: O(L) over the header producing k candidates, plus k HMACs at O(|body|) each. Space is O(k) beyond the body itself. Do the cheap rejections, including the tolerance check, before any cryptography runs.

Worked solution (15 min)

  1. Write the grammar on one line before coding: header := field (',' field)*, field := key '=' value, split on the first = only.
  2. Implement the parser to return {t: int, v1: [hex, ...]}, rejecting a missing t, a duplicate t, any v1 that is not 64 hex characters, and a header over 1 KiB, all before any cryptography runs.
  3. Implement the verifier: for each active secret compute HMAC-SHA256(secret, f'{t}.'.encode() + raw_body), compare it in constant time against each parsed v1, and OR the results with no early exit.
  4. Test with a valid signature; the same body with t moved 400 seconds into the past; the same body with t 400 seconds into the future; a header carrying an unknown v2= alongside a valid v1; and a body re-serialised with different JSON key order.

Expected result: The valid case accepts. Both out-of-tolerance cases reject, including the future one. The unknown v2 field is ignored and the v1 still verifies. The re-serialised body fails, which is correct and is exactly why the raw bytes must be retained.

Verify it yourself

  • Timing the comparison over 10,000 mismatching signatures that differ at the first character versus the last shows no separation you can measure.
  • Removing t from the MAC input makes an old captured body with its original signature pass. Write that test, watch it pass, then put t back.
  • Every rejection except the signature mismatch itself returns before an HMAC is computed.

Follow-up

  • The body is 40 MB. What changes about where you verify, and what can you do before the whole body has arrived?
  • A customer reports that signatures fail for exactly the requests whose body contains a non-ASCII character. What is your first hypothesis?
  • How do you rotate the signing secret with no failed deliveries, and how long do both secrets stay live?

Order a job dependency graph and find its critical path

Medium · topological-sort · dag-longest-path · cycle-detection · critical-path

A workspace defines up to 50,000 jobs with up to 200,000 dependency edges and an estimated duration_seconds per job. Given the edge list, reject the graph if it contains a cycle and name one cycle's nodes; otherwise return a valid execution order, the earliest possible completion time with unlimited workers, and the set of jobs whose slack is zero. Then say which single job to shorten in order to cut the completion time, and by exactly how much. State the complexity of each part.

Approach

  1. Kahn's algorithm for the order: compute indegrees, seed a queue with zero-indegree nodes, emit and decrement. O(V + E), which at 50,000 and 200,000 is milliseconds. If fewer than V nodes are emitted, the graph contains a cycle.
  2. Kahn detects a cycle but cannot name one. The nodes left with indegree above zero contain every cycle, so run one DFS restricted to that residual subgraph with three-colour marking and report the stack slice from the grey node the back edge points at. That is the difference between a usable error message and 'dependency cycle detected'.
  3. Earliest completion with unlimited workers is the longest path, which is NP-hard on a general graph and linear on a DAG. State the precondition, then relax in topological order: earliest_finish[v] = duration[v] + max(earliest_finish[u] for u in preds(v)), taking the max over an empty predecessor set as zero. The makespan T is the maximum over all nodes. O(V + E).
  4. Second pass in reverse topological order for latest_finish, then slack[v] = latest_finish[v] - earliest_finish[v]. Zero-slack nodes form the critical path, and there can be several disjoint critical paths, so return the set rather than one chain. slack[v] = 0 is exactly the statement that some longest path runs through v; equivalently, the longest path through v has length T - slack[v].
  5. The speed-up bound is the point of the question, and the obvious form of it is wrong. Shortening a zero-slack job v by d, with 0 <= d <= duration[v], cuts the makespan by min(d, T - L_avoid(v)), where L_avoid(v) is the longest path in the graph with v deleted: the longest path that avoids v, not the second-longest path overall. The two coincide only when the runner-up path misses v. Counterexample: A of 10 s feeds both B of 5 s and C of 4 s, so T = 15 s and the second-longest path is 14 s, yet shortening A by 10 s leaves a makespan of 5 s. The realised gain is the full 10 s, because both paths ran through A and shrank together, while min(10, 15 - 14) predicts 1 s. The reason is structural: shortening v reduces every path through v by d and leaves every other path alone, so the new makespan is max(T - d, L_avoid(v)).
  6. Compute L_avoid(v) the direct way: delete v and re-run the same forward relaxation, O(V + E) per candidate. The cheaper equivalent skips the deletion, since L_avoid(v) only ever matters through that max: set duration[v] := 0, recompute the makespan as T0(v) = max(T - duration[v], L_avoid(v)), and the gain is min(d, T - T0(v)), which is identical for every d <= duration[v]. Only zero-slack jobs are candidates, because shortening a job with positive slack changes the completion time not at all. One relaxation is milliseconds at this size, so ranking a critical set in the hundreds costs O(k(V + E)) and is worth doing exactly; a critical set in the tens of thousands is not, and there you evaluate a shortlist, longest jobs first, and say that the answer is the best of that shortlist rather than the optimum.

Follow-up

  • Only m workers are available. What happens to your answer, and what can you still promise about the schedule you produce?
  • Edges arrive incrementally as the customer edits the pipeline. How do you detect a cycle at insert time without re-running Kahn over 250,000 elements?
  • Durations are estimates. How would you express completion time as a distribution, and what breaks about the critical path once you do?

Schedule ordered webhook retries with a heap of subscription queues

Medium · heap · scheduling · backoff · head-of-line-blocking

Design the in-memory scheduler for webhook delivery. Up to 20 million rows sit in status pending or failed_retryable across 200,000 subscriptions, each row carrying next_attempt_at and attempt_count, and each endpoint having a circuit breaker. Deliveries for one subscription must be attempted in order, so at most one attempt per subscription may be in flight. Support due(now), complete(delivery, outcome) and insert(delivery) in O(log S), where S is the subscription count rather than the delivery count. Give the backoff formula you schedule retries with.

Approach

  1. Key the global heap by subscription, not by delivery. Each subscription owns a FIFO of its due deliveries in event order; the heap holds one entry per eligible subscription, keyed by its head's next_attempt_at. That is 200,000 heap entries instead of 20 million, and it makes the one-in-flight rule structural rather than a check somebody can forget.
  2. due(now): peek the minimum. If its key is in the future, sleep until then instead of spinning. Otherwise pop it, move the subscription into an in-flight set, and do not re-push it. A subscription absent from the heap cannot be dispatched twice, which is precisely how ordering is preserved.
  3. complete: on success, drop the head and re-push the subscription keyed by its new head, or leave it out when the queue empties. On a retryable failure, increment attempt_count and set next_attempt_at = now + uniform(0, min(cap, base * 2^attempt)), sampled uniformly across the whole interval. That is full jitter; deterministic backoff re-synchronises the herd you just created.
  4. Circuit breaker: park the subscription in a second heap keyed by its half-open time, so an endpoint dead for six hours costs one heap entry and zero attempts rather than consuming worker slots. Admit exactly one probe at half-open and close the breaker only on its success.
  5. Say the price of the ordering guarantee out loud. One in-flight attempt per subscription means an endpoint answering in 10 seconds drains at 0.1 deliveries/second however many workers you run, and its backlog grows until it recovers. If the customer does not need order, allow k in flight and document delivery as unordered; that is the trade, and it is a product decision.
  6. All three operations are O(log S) with O(S) resident heap memory and the queues themselves backed by the store. The database-backed equivalent is a partial index on (subscription_id, next_attempt_at) where status in ('pending','failed_retryable') claimed with FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED, and the write-back must be fenced on lease_token so a worker that stalled and resumed cannot overwrite a newer attempt.

Follow-up

  • One subscription has 4 million queued deliveries. What stops it from starving the other 199,999, and what does your heap look like under that load?
  • A customer requests redelivery of last Tuesday's events. Where do those rows enter your structure, and what keeps them from reordering live traffic?
  • The process restarts. How much state do you rebuild, and what stops every subscription from being attempted in the same second?

Enforce a concurrent-run quota that survives simultaneous requests

Medium · isolation levels · write skew · quotas · lock contention

A plan allows at most 20 concurrently running rows in job_run per tenant. The table holds run_id, tenant_id, workspace_id, status (queued, leased, running, succeeded, failed, timed_out, cancelled, lost), lease_token, leased_until, started_at and finished_at. Today the service runs select count(*) from job_run where tenant_id = $1 and status = 'running', compares the result to 20, then inserts. Under load a tenant exceeds the cap by exactly the number of concurrent requests. Name the anomaly, say which isolation levels do and do not prevent it, and give a version that holds, as SQL.

Approach

  1. Name it: write skew. Each transaction reads a predicate (the count of running rows), neither modifies what the other read, and both then insert rows that jointly violate an invariant no single row expresses. Read committed permits it. So does repeatable read, because snapshot isolation's first-updater-wins check fires only on conflicting row updates, and these are inserts touching disjoint rows.
  2. Enumerate the fixes with their real costs. SERIALIZABLE works: PostgreSQL's SSI tracks the predicate read and aborts one transaction with SQLSTATE 40001, which obliges the caller to retry and makes the abort rate rise with contention on a hot tenant. Folding the predicate into the write as insert ... select ... where (select count(*) ...) < 20 narrows the race to the statement's snapshot but does not close it under read committed.
  3. Give the version that holds at read committed: serialise on a row both transactions must touch. update tenant_concurrency set running = running + 1 where tenant_id = $1 and running < 20 returning running updates zero rows when the cap is reached, and zero rows is the rejection. This works because at read committed a blocked UPDATE re-evaluates its WHERE clause against the newly committed row; at repeatable read the same statement raises a serialisation error instead, so the isolation level changes the calling contract.
  4. State the cost you just bought. That row is now a per-tenant serialisation point, so admission throughput for the tenant is bounded by one divided by the lock hold time; at a 2 ms hold that is roughly 500 admissions/second. Keep the critical section to the single UPDATE, with no network call or scheduling decision inside the transaction, and decrement in the same transaction that writes the terminal status.
  5. Close the leak the status enum implies: a run can end as lost, so a crashed worker otherwise consumes a slot forever. Reconcile on a schedule against status = 'running' and leased_until < now(), and treat the counter as a fast path over job_run, which stays the system of record.

Follow-up

  • Write the retry loop for the SERIALIZABLE version. What does the caller see when it keeps aborting, and what bounds the retries?
  • Two regions each keep a counter. What is the effective cap, and what does admission do when the counter store is unreachable?
  • The cap changes mid-flight on a plan upgrade. Do running jobs get killed, and what does the counter row look like during the change?

Find the join that inflates every invoice total

Medium · join fan-out · aggregation grain · sql correctness

invoice_line_item holds line_id, invoice_id, tenant_id, sku, rate_tier, quantity, unit_price_micros, amount_minor (bigint), currency, kind, voided_at. invoice_payment_attempt holds attempt_id, invoice_id, tenant_id, amount_minor, status (succeeded, failed, pending), created_at, and an invoice has many attempts. A finance report runs select i.invoice_id, sum(l.amount_minor), count(p.attempt_id) from invoice i join invoice_line_item l using (invoice_id) join invoice_payment_attempt p using (invoice_id) group by 1 and the totals are wrong. Say precisely what the sum now equals, and write a version that is also correct for invoices with zero attempts.

Approach

  1. Compute what the query actually returns before fixing it. The two joins form a Cartesian product per invoice, so each line row repeats once per attempt row: sum(l.amount_minor) is the true total multiplied by the attempt count, and count(p.attempt_id) is attempts times lines. Three lines and two attempts report double the money and six attempts.
  2. Reject the reflex repair. count(distinct p.attempt_id) does fix the count, because attempt_id is unique. sum(distinct l.amount_minor) does not fix the sum, because two legitimate lines with equal amounts collapse into one. DISTINCT inside an aggregate deduplicates values, not rows, and the difference stays invisible until two lines happen to match.
  3. Aggregate each branch to invoice grain before joining: one CTE summing lines by invoice_id, one counting attempts by invoice_id, then join the two results. A LATERAL subquery per invoice is equivalent and sometimes plans better when the outer set is small. Either way every aggregate stays at the grain it was defined at.
  4. Keep invoices with no attempts by making the attempt branch a LEFT JOIN with coalesce(attempt_count, 0). An inner join here silently drops every unpaid invoice, which is usually the exact population finance is asking about.
  5. Push each filter to its own grain: where l.voided_at is null belongs inside the line CTE, not the outer query, or it would also filter the attempt branch through the join. Put the tenant predicate on both branches, since the denormalised tenant_id is what stops a wrong join crossing tenants.
  6. Leave yourself a standing check: an invoice total is a function of its non-voided lines and of nothing about payments, so if changing the payment filter moves the money figure, the fan-out is back.

Worked solution (25 min)

  1. Create one invoice with three lines of 1000, 1000 and 500 minor units and two payment attempts, then run the original query.
  2. Confirm it reports 5000 and 6 rather than 2500 and 2.
  3. Apply sum(distinct l.amount_minor) and confirm the total becomes 1500, which is worse rather than better.
  4. Write the two-CTE version with a LEFT JOIN and coalesce, and confirm 2500 and 2.
  5. Add a second invoice with lines and no attempts and confirm it still appears.

Expected result: The original sum equals the true line total multiplied by the number of payment attempts and the count equals attempts times lines; the corrected query pre-aggregates each branch to invoice grain in separate CTEs and LEFT JOINs them with coalesce, with voided lines excluded inside the line CTE and the tenant predicate applied to both branches.

Verify it yourself

  • The money total is unchanged by adding or removing payment attempts.
  • An invoice with zero attempts appears with its total and a zero count.
  • Two lines with identical amounts both contribute to the total.
  • Voiding a line changes the money figure and leaves the attempt count alone.

Follow-up

  • Add a third branch for credit notes applied to the invoice. Does the CTE shape still hold, and when would a single pass with filter (where ...) be better?
  • Over 500k invoices this report takes minutes. Which grain would you materialise, and how do you keep it correct when a line is voided?
  • The same report is needed per tenant per month. What index makes the line CTE cheap?

What is Ledinegg instability, how does it arise, and how can it be mitigated?

Medium

Approach

  1. Work from the requirement backwards to the design.
  2. State your assumptions explicitly before working the problem.
  3. Say what you would check first and why it is the highest-information step.

Follow-up

  • What assumption would you test first?
  • How would you know your answer was wrong?

What is the equation for heat conduction and what do the terms mean?

Medium

Approach

  1. State your assumptions explicitly before working the problem.
  2. Say what you would check first and why it is the highest-information step.
  3. Clarify what is being asked and what a complete answer contains.

Follow-up

  • How would you know your answer was wrong?
  • What assumption would you test first?

Specify webhook signature verification a customer can implement

Easy · webhooks · hmac · replay protection

The webhook-delivery service signs each payload before POSTing it to a customer endpoint. Write the signature specification a customer implements in their own language: the header format, exactly which bytes are signed, the algorithm, how replay is bounded, and how a signing secret rotates without a delivery gap. Then write the verification steps the customer performs, in order, including what they compare and what they return on failure. Constraint: most customers reach for their web framework's parsed JSON body by default. Deliverable: the spec section plus reference pseudocode.

Approach

  1. Sign the concatenation of the timestamp and the raw body, t + "." + body, and emit a header of the form t=<unix seconds>,v1=<hex>. The timestamp has to be inside the MAC, or an attacker re-stamps a captured body and the tolerance window buys nothing.
  2. Require the raw request bytes. A framework that parses JSON and re-serialises it changes key order, whitespace and number formatting, so the spec must tell the customer to capture the body before the parser runs and give the middleware note for each common framework.
  3. Use HMAC-SHA256, not sha256(secret || body): SHA-256 is a Merkle-Damgard construction, so the naive form admits length extension. Require a constant-time comparison as well, since a short-circuiting byte compare leaks the expected prefix under repeated probing.
  4. Bound replay in two layers: reject when |now - t| exceeds a stated tolerance such as 300 seconds, then deduplicate on the event identifier header. The tolerance is what makes the customer's dedup store finite rather than unbounded.
  5. Rotate by allowing two live secrets and emitting both signatures in one header (v1=<old>,v1=<new>); the customer accepts if any candidate matches, so neither side needs an instantaneous cutover. A failed verification returns 400 and the body is not processed.

Worked solution (15 min)

  1. Write the header grammar and one real example line with a plausible timestamp and hex digest.
  2. Write the signed string construction explicitly as a byte concatenation, and add the sentence telling the customer where in their framework to obtain the raw body.
  3. Write the five verification steps in order: extract t and candidates, check the tolerance, recompute the HMAC over t + '.' + raw body, compare in constant time against each candidate, then deduplicate on the event identifier.
  4. Add the rotation paragraph: two active secrets, both signatures sent, overlap window stated in the dashboard.
  5. State the failure response and the fact that the payload is not processed, plus what the sender does with that 400.

Expected result: A spec where the signed input is the timestamp joined to the exact raw bytes, the algorithm is HMAC-SHA256 compared in constant time, replay is bounded by a stated tolerance plus event-id deduplication, and rotation is an overlap of two accepted signatures rather than a cutover.

Verify it yourself

  • The timestamp is inside the signed string, not merely sent alongside it.
  • The spec names raw bytes and says where the customer gets them before parsing.
  • Rotation requires no coordinated instant on either side.
  • The reason for HMAC over sha256(secret || body) is stated as length extension, not as a preference.

Follow-up

  • A customer's verification passes locally and fails in production behind a proxy that re-encodes the response body. Where do you look first?
  • Why sign with a per-endpoint secret rather than the tenant's API key?

A rare job-run overwrite that logging makes disappear

Hard · fencing tokens · leases · concurrency

About one job run in fifty thousand records billable_seconds matching no observed sandbox lifetime, and a few rows show worker_id changing after finished_at was already set. It does not reproduce: debug logging around the terminal write made it vanish for two weeks before it returned. Runs last from 200 ms to 30 minutes, the lease is 60 seconds and is renewed while a run executes. Give an ordered checklist, the mechanism, and a fix that makes the illegal write impossible rather than merely rarer.

Approach

  1. Mine the evidence instead of chasing a repro: select rows where updated_at is later than finished_at, or where a terminal status was written twice, and join them to attempt history to recover both writer identities. The defect has already happened tens of times and the rows are the recording.
  2. State the signature before measuring it. If the cause is a lease that expired while the original worker was stalled, affected runs should cluster where the gap between the last renewal and the terminal write exceeds the lease, and should correlate with worker pause metrics rather than with workload shape.
  3. Read the disappearance honestly. Logging inside the window changed the timing and lowered the probability; it is evidence about how narrow the window is, not a fix. Reproduce by widening the window on purpose, shortening the lease and injecting a pause between sandbox exit and the terminal write, rather than by adding more instrumentation.
  4. Name the mechanism precisely: the lease expires during a stall such as a long garbage-collection pause or a brief partition, the run is re-dispatched, and the original worker then wakes and writes its terminal state over the new attempt's row. A lease alone cannot stop this, because the check and the write are separated by the stall.
  5. Fix by fencing the write itself: UPDATE job_run SET status = $2, finished_at = $3, billable_seconds = $4 WHERE run_id = $1 AND status = 'running' AND lease_token = $5, with zero rows affected interpreted as having been fenced rather than as success. The token lives on the row so the store arbitrates, not the worker's memory.
  6. Keep the state machine honest: a retry inserts a new row pointing at parent_run_id rather than resetting the old one, and a run whose worker vanished terminates as lost with billable_seconds null, because recording failure asserts an outcome nobody observed and then bills and retries on that assertion.

Follow-up

  • The supervisor also emits a usage event on completion. What does the fenced worker do about the event it already emitted, and how does metering absorb it?
  • Lease renewal is itself a network call. What happens when a renewal times out, and how does the worker decide whether it still holds the lease?
  • Why is lengthening the lease past the longest legitimate run the wrong lever, and what breaks if you do it anyway?

Suggested practice checklist

For a candidate senior enough that the loop turns on design and judgement rather than on whether the coding round gets finished. Five days build one system properly and then stress it; coding gets a single maintenance day, on the assumption that the risk at this level is an unexamined tradeoff rather than a missed algorithm.

Day 1 — Numbers before diagrams

  • Build your own reference card of the figures you will re-derive all week: bytes for a realistic record, requests per second implied by a given daily active count, and the storage that a year at a given write rate produces. Derive each one rather than copying it, because the derivation is what survives a follow-up.
  • Turn one product statement into capacity requirements. From ten million daily users at four writes and forty reads each, state the peak-to-average factor you are assuming and why, then produce peak write QPS, peak read QPS and a year of storage.
  • Write the two numbers whose order of magnitude changes the design, the read-to-write ratio and the working-set size against memory per node, and state the threshold at which each one flips your answer.

Deliverable: A one-page numbers card and one worked capacity estimate with every assumption written down.

Day 2 — One system, from requirements to schema

  • Spend the first ten minutes producing only functional requirements, non-functional targets with numbers attached, a p99 latency, a durability expectation, a consistency requirement, and an explicit out-of-scope list.
  • Define the interface before the boxes: the three or four endpoints, their parameters, what each returns, and which of them are idempotent.
  • Write the data model, then write the single access pattern that justifies it, and state what the schema would have to become if the dominant access pattern were the other one.

Deliverable: One design carried to endpoint-and-schema depth, with non-functional targets expressed as numbers and a written out-of-scope list.

Day 3 — The consistency you are actually buying

  • Write out what a client sees under asynchronous replication when its write commits on the leader and its next read is served by a lagging follower, then write the two fixes, pinning that session's reads to the leader for a bounded window or carrying a version token the replica must reach, and the cost of each.
  • Work the quorum arithmetic on paper for N of three with W and R of two, and separate what R + W > N does guarantee, that any read set intersects any write set, from what it does not: on its own it is not linearizability, and a sloppy quorum that accepts writes on nodes outside the preference list breaks even the intersection.
  • Take two storage choices with different defaults, a single-leader relational store committing synchronously and a quorum-replicated store that converges eventually, and write the specific product behaviour that would be wrong under each, rather than a general statement about which is stronger.

Deliverable: A page separating what quorum overlap guarantees from what it does not, with one concrete product misbehaviour attached to each gap.

Day 4 — Failure is the design

  • For one write path, work through the case where the client times out after the server has already committed, then design the idempotency key: who generates it, how long it is retained, and what the duplicate request returns.
  • Express the retry policy as parameters rather than as a word: maximum attempts, base delay, backoff factor, jitter, and which error classes are retried at all. Then state why retrying a non-idempotent write without a key is a correctness bug and not merely waste.
  • Compute the fan-out effect on tail latency. If a request waits on ten backends and each independently exceeds its p99 one percent of the time, the chance at least one is slow is 1 - 0.99^10, about ten percent. Then write why independence is the optimistic assumption and what correlates them in practice.
  • Name the backpressure mechanism for one queue or one dependency in the design, a bounded queue with shedding or a concurrency limit, and write what the caller is told when it engages.

Deliverable: One write path with an idempotency design, a parameterised retry policy, and a written tail-latency calculation with its assumption named.

Day 5 — Scaling the hot path

  • Choose cache-aside or write-through for one read path and write the staleness window each produces, then name the invalidation event and what the system does when that event is lost.
  • Design against the stampede: either coalesce requests so only one recomputes a missing key, or refresh early with jittered expiry, and write why identical TTLs on keys populated in the same moment produce a synchronised expiry and a thundering herd.
  • Shard one table by a key you choose, then answer the two questions that break the choice: which queries now require a scatter-gather, and what happens to the distribution when one tenant is a hundred times larger than the median.
  • Write the cost of adding a node under plain modulo placement, where nearly every key moves, against consistent hashing, where roughly one key in n+1 moves, and state what virtual nodes are for.

Deliverable: A caching and sharding decision for one path, each with its failure mode and its rebalancing cost written beside it.

Day 6 — Keep the coding hand in, at the bar that applies to you

  • Solve one medium problem in thirty minutes, then spend twenty more making it production-shaped: named invariants, validation at the boundary, and errors that distinguish a caller mistake from an internal fault.
  • Write the tests you would require of a colleague's version of that function: one for empty input, one for the boundary, and one for the case the implementation is most likely to get wrong.
  • Read a piece of your own code from six months ago and write the change you would ask for, phrased as you would actually phrase it in review.

Deliverable: One problem hardened to review standard, with its test list and one written review comment.

Day 7 — Defend it while being interrupted

  • Run a forty-five-minute design mock with an interviewer briefed to change a requirement halfway, a tenfold traffic increase or a new strict consistency requirement, and to push on one number you estimated.
  • Rehearse the two sentences a senior loop is listening for: naming the tradeoff you are choosing against and why, and saying what you would measure to learn that the choice was wrong.
  • Prepare the design you regret: a real decision, the constraint that produced it, what it cost, and what you changed afterwards.

Deliverable: Mock notes recording how the design changed under the new requirement, plus a written account of one regretted decision.

Risky changes and the reversal path

For anything that touched live traffic, be ready to say how you would have undone it: a flag, a staged rollout, dual writes with the old path still authoritative. Once the old column is dropped or the source rows are overwritten there is no reverse, so name what you kept a copy of and for how long.

Tell me about yourself and why you are a good fit for this role.

Medium · behavioural and engineering judgement

Approach

  1. Close with what you would do differently, concretely.
  2. Name the disagreement and how you resolved it with evidence.
  3. Pick a story where you made the decision, not one where you watched it.

Follow-up

  • What did you decide not to do, and why?
  • How did you know your change caused the improvement?

What motivates you in your professional career?

Medium · behavioural and engineering judgement

Approach

  1. Name the disagreement and how you resolved it with evidence.
  2. Close with what you would do differently, concretely.
  3. Give the blast radius: what could have broken, and what you measured.

Follow-up

  • What would you do differently if you ran that again?
  • What did you decide not to do, and why?

Tell me about a time you had a disagreement with a team member.

Medium · behavioural and engineering judgement

Approach

  1. Close with what you would do differently, concretely.
  2. Pick a story where you made the decision, not one where you watched it.
  3. Give the blast radius: what could have broken, and what you measured.

Follow-up

  • What did you decide not to do, and why?
  • How did you know your change caused the improvement?

Describe how you tackled a difficult situation.

Medium · behavioural and engineering judgement

Approach

  1. Pick a story where you made the decision, not one where you watched it.
  2. Close with what you would do differently, concretely.
  3. State the situation in two sentences and spend the rest on the reasoning.

Follow-up

  • How did you know your change caused the improvement?
  • What did you decide not to do, and why?